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Lack of Clarity Blamed for U. S. Mistakes

Most second guessing today on American foreign policy starts with wartime collaboration between the United States and Russia and stresses our lack at that time of carefully thought-out, far-sighted peace aims. In my opinion it was in the interest of both the United States and Russia during the war to do all in their power to defeat Germany, each contributed mightily to that defeat, and disparagement of either country's wartime contribution is unpardonable.

Wartime Mistakes

What one sees more clearly now than in the midst of hostilities is that the United States then lacked both an enlightened concept of what would constitute a just and enduring peace and the will to pursue its post-war objectives as effectively as it sought military victory. The men who formulated American foreign policy, beginning with President Roosevelt and including most of his principal associates, did not sufficiently understand or take cognizance of the theory, practice and aspirations of the Russian Communists. Had our policy makers been aware of basic Leninist-Stalinist aims and been able to perceive them in the midst of shifting Soviet tactics, the post-war security and freedom of the United States and the other non-Soviet peoples could have been better safeguarded without jeopardizing wartime collaboration between Russia and the Western democracies.

Realistic comprehension of Moscow's continuing belief in the ultimate necessity of universalizing Soviet rule need not have prevented President Roosevelt, Wendell

Willkie and others who believed in the possibility of peaceable coexistence of capitalistic democracies and Communist dictatorships from trying to win over the Soviet leadership to that concept. Many

U.S. Policy Under Review

Current public discussion of American foreign policy has revealed great differences of opinion as to whether the United States committed errors in the past, and as to the course it should pursue in the future. The Foreign Policy Association has invited experts of differing points of view to present their conclusions on some of the major issues under discussion. The third of these articles appears in the adjoining columns.

more Americans would still believe that the present tensions and anxieties are due to our failure to reassure Russia of our friendly intentions had our leaders between 1941 and 1945 not gone far beyond the second mile to convince Soviet rulers of our desire to continue the wartime collaboration after victory. These past attempts to allay Russia's fears should be constantly kept fresh in the minds of all peoples to counteract Communist propaganda about American "warmongering."

But we need not, and should not, have sacrificed valuable strategic positions to the U.S.S.R. for it to use against us. In territorial arrangements such as those concerning Berlin, Austria and Korea we provided Moscow with great opportunities to increase its strength at the expense

of the peace and security of the free peoples. In the Yalta arrangement under which we promised to Russia rights in Chinese territory without China's consent or knowledge we revealed a lack of ethics as well as of strategic common sense.

Lessons to Learn

We have become aware of some of our errors in dealing with the Communist revolution and are now conducting our foreign relations more intelligently than during the war and immediate post-war period. But we still have much to learn about what a great power and a creditor nation must do to remain strong, prosperous and at peace. We still have much to learn about the techniques of defending free institutions against a militant international revolutionary movement having a powerful nation as its fulcrum.

We are still paying for some of the mistakes we made during our period of improvisation, appeasement and not wholly discarded isolationism. Here are some examples:

The present difficulties over Communist China's seat in the Security Council might not have arisen had we not insisted during the war that Chiang Kai-shek's China be treated as a great power despite its manifest lack of qualifications for such a status.

The inability to make the United Nations the effective instrument for collective security which it was expected to become is due partly to our willingness to pay almost any price for Russia's participation, and partly to our own preoccupation with national sovereignty.

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Our failure to reach intelligent war-time decisions as to how to integrate Germany, Japan, Korea and Austria into the post-war world order resulted in arrangements which serve Russia's ends and disserve ours.

Our failure to shape our policies toward China and Palestine in the bipartisan spirit in which the United Nations, Marshall Plan and Atlantic pact policies were shaped has weakened us at home, in the UN, in Asia and in the Middle East.

Our foreign policies must be formulated from the point of view of the long-term national interest rather than dictated by pressure groups—economic, sectional, racial, religious or political. Our people must be kept aware of the inherent worth of our basic institutions. We must understand the deep hostility to free institutions of dictatorships—Communist or Fascist—based on the negation of freedom of speech, assembly, worship, election and enterprise. Only by such awareness will Americans be prepared to make whatever sacrifices may be required to defend and

preserve our institutions in peace or war.

We must be ready to wage a shooting war if that should be forced upon us. We must be prepared to defend ourselves in the cold war for decades if the Soviet power elects to wage a nonshooting struggle against the democracies for that length of time. I believe the chances of a prolonged struggle in the political and economic sphere are much greater than those of a shooting war, but we must remain capable of successfully defending ourselves in either eventuality.

Preparing for Long Pull

This situation makes it necessary to husband our resources carefully and conduct our domestic affairs so that our economic and political order remains sound and stable. It calls for cooperation with like-minded nations and, where necessary, discerning aid to them. Of these, the chief is Britain, the one ally upon whom we can most assuredly count. Close seconds are the democracies of Western Europe. It is essential to devote the preponderance of our economic and military aid to those

countries most capable of remaining free.

Since we cannot help everyone, we must concentrate our aid where it will count most for the defense of freedom instead of expending it in a way which may leave neither the United States nor any other part of the world able to withstand the Soviet challenge permanently. By successfully conducting our policies to this end we will have a better chance of persuading Russia that peaceful coexistence is possible and desirable. If Russia recognizes our ability to survive in freedom, settlements which now seem unlikely might be reached in a spirit of mutual accommodation and on terms not attainable by the exercise of personal charm, appeal to good will, flaunting of power or appeasement.

CARROLL BINDER

(Carroll Binder, editor of editorial pages in the *Minneapolis Tribune* since 1945, was previously the director of the foreign service of the *Chicago Daily News*. He is now serving as U.S. representative on the UN Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information. He is also a board member of the Minneapolis FPA Branch and represents all the North Central Branches on the FPA's national Board of Directors. Mr. Binder has just returned from a trip to Europe.)

Baltic Incident Reaction Troubles Washington

WASHINGTON—The mildness of public reaction to the Soviet-American plane incident in the region of the Baltic Sea on April 8 and to Moscow's rejection on April 21 of the American protest has confirmed the belief of some high officials in the State Department that many Americans are growing insensitive to what they consider the menacing nature of Soviet policy.

Public Apathy

This concern over a certain lethargy in public opinion prompted Secretary of State Dean Acheson to make his speech at the University of California on March 16, where he renewed his proposal that the United States engage in "total diplomacy." The same concern prompted President Truman to recommend on April 20 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, meeting in Washington, that the United States undertake a "campaign of truth" capable of being "heard around the world" to offset the appeal and strength of Soviet political propaganda. "The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world today by the forces of imperialistic communism," the President said. These and other addresses in similar vein have not yet aroused the nation.

While the official speeches bear no prom-

ise of peace, it seems unlikely that the Administration, in sponsoring them, is trying to put the country in a mood to prepare for war. Rather the President and State Department appear to wish that the country would give greater support to the foreign policy programs designed to keep the peace. Although Secretary Acheson on February 16 told the Advertising Council, meeting at the White House, that "the only way to deal with the Soviet Union . . . is to create situations of strength," the present session of Congress has not noticeably added to the strength of the United States in coping with world problems.

Congress is willing to renew the Marshall Plan for another year but—so far—is not enthusiastic about encouraging foreign nations to increase their exports to the United States. Congress hesitates to support even the timid Point Four program for building up underdeveloped areas which the State Department has submitted to the Capitol. Congress favors the "blockade" of shipments of heavy goods from the Western world to the Soviet area but shows decreasing interest in providing the funds necessary to subsidize those Western nations which lose income from lagging commerce with the East.

The Administration itself is seeking to

persuade its partners in the North Atlantic pact to increase their expenditures for armaments, but at the same time the Economic Cooperation Administration continues to recommend that all the Marshall Plan countries (which include most of the North Atlantic pact countries) keep public expenditures at a reasonably low level and balance their budgets. Such contradictions have not aroused serious public complaint here. While the American people may not generally support the idea of talks with Moscow, much articulate opinion implies a loss of confidence in the State Department and an inclination to counter Soviet strength simply by making the country strong at home.

The Baltic Plane

The case of the Baltic plane disclosed that the strength which the United States possesses is not enough to frighten the Soviet Union into inactivity in world affairs. The incident, which occurred on April 8, was not revealed until April 11, when the Soviet government protested formally to the United States. The Soviet note contended that an American B-29 military plane had flown over Latvia (the Soviet government considers Latvia an autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union, but the United States does not recognize

its annexation), had opened fire on Soviet planes which were demanding that the American plane follow them to an airfield, and had disappeared out to sea after Russian planes had fired upon it.

United States officials commented that no American armed plane had been in that part of the world, but that an unarmed Navy Privateer plane had flown from Wiesbaden, Germany, bound for Copenhagen, Denmark, on a round-trip training flight. Copenhagen is 350 miles east of Latvia. The British steamship *Beechland* on April 16 found an aircraft life raft, thought to belong to the missing Privateer, in the Baltic Sea forty-five miles southeast of Stockholm, which faces a part of the Baltic closer to Latvia than to

Copenhagen. The ten men aboard the plane are lost. The Administration on April 18 protested to the Soviet government that Russian planes had shot down the Privateer over the Baltic—beyond Soviet territorial waters—and that the Privateer had been unarmed. The note demanded that the Soviet Union pay “an appropriate indemnity.” The Soviet Union on April 21, rejecting the American protest, refused to pay the indemnity, reasserting that the plane had been armed, had fired shots, was a B-29 and had flown over Latvian territory to “photograph Soviet defense installations.”

There the matter rests. The Senate on April 19 and the House on April 21, by unanimous votes in both instances, passed

a resolution directing the Secretary of the Navy to confer posthumous decorations on the missing crewmen. Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee on April 21 termed the shooting of the plane an “act of aggression.” Yet, so far as one can see from Washington, the country remains calm. In view of the seeming reluctance of Congress and the public to support fully the foreign policy recommendations of the Administration, the United States might reconsider the assumption that present emphasis on American strength will force the Soviet Union to change its policies. Reiteration of that emphasis may eventually strengthen only the isolationists.

BLAIR BOLLES

How Will Peace Treaty Affect Japanese Politics?*

Discussions of a peace treaty with Japan, revived by the Sino-Russian treaty and spurred by our current efforts to hammer out an integrated Far Eastern policy, raise the question of what kind of a government Japan is likely to have after the treaty has been concluded. Under the parliamentary system prescribed by the SCAP-sponsored constitution of 1947, the government will be formed by the party or parties which control the National Diet.

Political Spectrum

As of today all the major parties aspiring to form that future government, with one qualified exception, are direct lineal descendants of pre-war political organizations. This is true of the entire political spectrum from the Communist party and a small radical Marxist group on the far left, through a congeries of splinter groups clustered about the Social Democratic party in the center, the small People's Cooperative party immediately to the right, the mildly conservative Democratic party, about one-third of whose members joined the Democratic Liberals in January, and at the far right the Democratic Liberal party, which controls the present cabinet.

The outstanding characteristic of the present political scene in Japan is the overwhelming parliamentary power of the Democratic Liberals—with 288 seats in a 466-member House of Representatives—contrasted with the utter weakness of any opposition, left, middle or right. No opposition party commands even 50 seats.

*This article is published in cooperation with the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

The Communist party has been hampered not only by its own blunders but by SCAP measures and is now at its lowest political ebb since 1946. Among its blunders were the series of terroristic “incidents” of 1949, its amazing misjudgment of Japanese psychology in handling the repatriation issue last year, and its acceptance of the Cominform's criticism of party leader Sanzo Nosaka in February 1950. SCAP, meanwhile, took measures that eliminated some of the maladjustments which would otherwise have played into the hands of the Communists. Among these measures, the most important were the early encouragement of the labor movement, the enfranchisement of women and the extensive land reform program.

Dominance of the Liberals

In the absence of any significant opposition it is probable that the Democratic Liberal party under Premier Shigeru Yoshida will continue to give Japan a strongly conservative government until the peace treaty is signed or, alternatively, until the end of the House of Representatives' term in 1953. This party, therefore, probably will control the government that takes power after the conclusion of the peace treaty.

The overwhelming strength of the Democratic Liberals does not mean, however, that Japan has achieved political stability. SCAP's powerful influence on party politics continues, and Yoshida's cherished dream of a two-party system is no nearer realization. Moreover, the party itself lacks political coherence. The Dem-

ocratic Liberals, who returned to power in October 1948 after seventeen months in opposition, were essentially the beneficiaries rather than the instigators of a conservative tide that still runs in their favor.

This trend toward conservatism constitutes one of the significant political watersheds in occupation history. In 1948 the moderate groups were thoroughly discredited, and SCAP was shifting from punishment and reform to vigorous support of Japanese economic revival and opposition to communism. This change made SCAP's future policies more readily predictable and lessened the need for continuing the former close liaison maintained by political parties with the occupation authorities. All political parties consequently began to emphasize increasingly their Japanese character. A similar countrywide reaction to these factors, plus the Communist tactics, produced a change in public sentiment favorable to the conservatives.

It is true, nevertheless, that the Democratic Liberal party, once in power, showed considerable improvement over the inept, unimaginative, fearful, conservative reaction which characterized its government in 1946-47. But its strength has not been fully tested and can not be so long as the country—and the Democratic Liberals—depend on the various economic and other aids offered by the United States, and so long as SCAP cushions Japan against the pressures of the cold war. SCAP's continued influence in Japanese politics is indicated by the effects of its recent measures to resist the current labor

demands for wage increases in the interest of economic stability.

Peace Will Bring Tests

The establishment of the two-party system hoped for by Yoshida still lies in the future. In Yoshida's view the choice is between his party and the Social Democrats. The Liberals must move yet closer to the center, and the Socialists must unite more around a non-Marxist middle position before a genuine two-party system can emerge. To this process there are many obstacles. A two-party system is more the result than the cause of political stability, although there are practical aids which would promote its emergence. Too little attention has been paid to Japan's single-ballot, multiple-member constituency, which, as a form of proportional representation, practically guarantees a multiplicity of parties in the Diet.

Japan thus approaches peace treaty negotiations with outward political stability and unity that are in reality insubstantial and superficial, yet with a single party in power in a nation which politically remains essentially conservative. The major political fact of the future will be the peace treaty itself. Japan wants a treaty or treaties which will guarantee its peace and territorial integrity. The Japanese recognize that they will have no negotiating status in the drafting of such a treaty and will have to accept what is presented to them. Thus the peace treaty will not become a real political issue until after it has been signed.

The principal question for the Japanese today is whether the grant of military bases to the United States would enable them to avoid war or would make their embroilment a certainty. The Democratic Liberals, perhaps because they are the party in power, accept the idea of granting bases to the United States; the Democrats reluctantly agree. The Socialists and Communists are flatly opposed. From the record it would appear that given a free choice the Japanese would prefer a military guarantee by the United States without the grant of bases. Some claim that our moral strength in Asia would be heightened by a multilateral guarantee of Japan's neutrality and territorial integrity by all nations signatory to the peace treaty,

even though all recognize us as the principal guarantor. Some Japanese also look to the United Nations for protection.

The peace treaty negotiations offer the United States an opportunity not only to help stabilize Japanese government and party politics but also to stabilize peace in Asia.

KENNETH E. COLTON

(Before the war Kenneth E. Colton served as assistant editor of the *Annals of Iowa* and director of manuscripts in the Iowa State Department of History and Archives. From February 1946 to January 1950 he was attached to the occupation headquarters of the Far Eastern Command in Tokyo. As a research analyst he was concerned with the activities of Japanese non-Communist political parties.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

ST. PAUL, April 28, *Tito and the Cominform*, Joseph Korbel

*CLEVELAND, May 3, *What's Right with American Foreign Policy?*, James Warburg

*NEW YORK, May 3, *What Should We Do in Europe?*, Off-the-Record Discussion

OKLAHOMA CITY, May 4, *Britain's Role in the World Today*, Paul H. Gore-Booth

*MILWAUKEE, May 5-6, *Regional Conference on U.S. Foreign Policy*, in cooperation with the Department of State

*ST. LOUIS, May 5, *Can the Armaments Race Be Stopped?*, Frank C. Nash

*NEW YORK, May 8, *Pakistan and the Western World*, DINNER IN HONOR OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN AND BEGUM LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

OKLAHOMA CITY, May 8, *America's Stake in the Near East*, Hon George C. McGhee

*NEW YORK, May 10, *How Can We Implement Our Economic Policy?*, Off-the-Record Discussion

*Data taken from printed announcement.

The Peaceful Revolution, by Herbert Morrison. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1949. Distributed by The Macmillan Co. \$2.00.

A collection of speeches by Britain's Deputy Prime Minister and Lord President of the Council. They reveal Morrison as a Socialist who can seem both militant and moderate, a quality that has made him the most astute political strategist in the Attlee cabinet.

News in the Making

FORMOSAN OUTLOOK DARKENS: Prospects for China's Kuomintang regime's holding out in Formosa and the tiny island of Chusan appeared darker as the evacuation of Hainan off the South China coast began on April 23. The Nationalist News Agency reported heavy casualties, but Communist and independent observers indicated that the capital city of Hoihow had fallen without a fight and that the Reds were encountering little resistance in their advance across the island.

CRISIS DEEPENS IN GERMANY: Relations between the Western Allies and the West German state have deteriorated as a result of a controversy over proposed income tax reductions by the Bonn government. In a High Commission letter to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, released April 23, the occupation powers—while not forbidding the reduction—insisted that proposed adjustments must be consistent with budgetary stability.

AUSTERITY AGAIN: Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, meted out another austerity budget on April 18, shaving income taxes at certain points but increasing taxes on gasoline and commercial vehicles. By keeping government expenditure and revenue in balance, Sir Stafford is attempting to hold Britain on a narrow path toward recovery. His budget pleased neither the Conservative opposition nor left-wing Laborites who want to strengthen the party's appeal to the voters.

SOLIDARITY WITH ARGENTINA: A new phase in United States-Argentine relations initiated with the visit of Assistant Secretary of State Edward G. Miller, Jr. last February may result in the long-awaited settlement of economic differences between the two countries. The bases for the understanding would be Washington's desire to reinforce the 1947 hemisphere military alliance by securing Argentina's ratification and Perón's need for dollar credits to wipe out an accumulated trade deficit estimated at \$100 million and to finance machinery imports.